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BARRIERS TO THE BALLOT BOX: IMPLICIT BIAS AND
VOTING RIGHTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Arusha Gordon* & Ezra D. Rosenberg**
While much has been written regarding unconscious or “implicit bias” in
other areas of law, there is a scarcity of scholarship examining how implicit bias
impacts voting rights and how advocates can move courts to recognize evidence of
implicit bias within the context of a voting rights claim. This Article aims to
address that scarcity. After reviewing research on implicit bias, this Article exam-
ines how implicit bias might impact different stages of the electoral process. It then
argues that “results test” claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)
present an opportunity for plaintiffs to introduce evidence regarding implicit bias in
the electoral process. In addition, this Article explores policy solutions to reduce the
impact of implicit bias in elections.
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INTRODUCTION
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the passage of the Voting
Rights Act (VRA),1 a law that changed the voting rights landscape dra-
matically. Today the Jim Crow era of literacy tests and total denial of access
to the ballot box for minorities is gone. Though participation of minority
voters in the electoral process has increased, several states have recently
implemented policies that threaten these gains.2 For example, despite
scarce evidence of in-person voter fraud, states continue to pass laws re-
quiring voters to present forms of photo identification in order to vote,
which some voters do not have.3 Many of these laws have a disproportion-
ate impact on minorities, as minorities are less likely than Whites to have
acceptable identification.4
What makes the protection of voting rights against racial discrimina-
tion particularly challenging is that, while Americans today might not in-
tend to discriminate and are less likely than were previous generations to
express racial motivations for an action, unconscious biases continue to
influence individual and organizational decisions.5 This Article explores
unconscious, or “implicit,” bias in the electoral process and examines how
research on implicit bias might fit within the current legal framework of
voting rights.
The next section of this Article provides a general overview of im-
plicit bias. Part II examines the electoral process and highlights how im-
plicit bias might impact each stage, from the allocation of resources for
voting to decisions made by poll workers on Election Day regarding who
1. 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301 (West 2015).
2. See Corey Dade, Election Study: Black Turnout May Have Surpassed That of Whites,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/12/27/1681
55895/election-study-black-turnout-may-have-surpassed-whites.
3. As of August 2015, “[a] total of thirty-four states had passed laws requiring voters to
show identification” in order to vote, and “32 of these voter identification laws are in force.”
Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLA-
TURES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx.
Seven of these states have strict photo ID requirements. Id.
4. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th
Cir. 2014); Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 658 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
remanded sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Forrest Wickman,
Why Do Many Minorities Lack ID?, SLATE (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/explainer/2012/08/voter_id_laws_why_do_minorities_lack_id_to_show_at
_the_polls_.html (explaining that voter-ID laws disenfranchise minority voters who are less
likely to have the most common form of identification, a driver’s license, “because they are more
likely to be poor and to live in urban areas” where they do not drive).
5. See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N.C., 682 F.2d 1055, 1064 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Munic-
ipal officials acting in their official capacities seldom, if ever, announce on the record that they
are pursuing a particular course of action because of their desire to discriminate against a racial
minority. Even individuals acting from invidious motivations realize the unattractiveness of their
prejudices when faced with their perpetuation in the public record . . . so it is rare that these
statements can be captured for purposes of proving racial discrimination in a case such as this.”).
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may vote a regular ballot. Part III discusses the legal framework for voting
rights advocacy today. Finally, Part IV argues that the “results test” in Sec-
tion 2 of the VRA provides an opportunity for courts to consider evidence
of implicit bias within the electoral context. In addition, Part IV provides
examples of how evidence regarding implicit bias can be incorporated into
a “results test” claim and discusses policy reforms to reduce the impact of
implicit bias in the voting arena.
I. IMPLICIT BIAS DEFINED
Implicit bias describes the phenomenon by which decisions are im-
pacted by unconscious prejudices held in the brain. Psychological research
on implicit bias has gained significance in recent decades,6 following the
1998 introduction of the implicit association test (IAT).7 The IAT mea-
sures “the strengths of associations among concepts.”8 The IAT operates
by showing participants a set of images and words and asking them to
classify the images and words into groups as quickly as possible.9 The speed
with which a participant is able to classify these words or images is tracked
and used to measure how strongly one implicitly associates those words or
images with the general categories (i.e. how strongly one associates Afri-
can-Americans with negative attributes and European Americans with
positive attributes).10 “The IAT operates on the supposition that when the
two concepts are highly associated, the sorting task will be easier and thus
require less time than when the concepts are not highly associated.”11 Of
the more than two million users who had visited implicit.harvard.edu to
take the IAT, sixty- eight percent of them had some level of implicit bias
6. Cheryl Staats et. al., State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2015, KIRWAN INST. FOR
THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY 1 (2015), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/up
loads/2015/05/2015-kirwan-implicit-bias.pdf.
7. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan K.L. Schwartz,
Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. OF PERS. &
SOC. PSYCH. 1464, 1464-80 (1998).
8. Brian A. Nosek, Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Associa-
tion Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review, AUTOMATIC PROCESSES IN SOCIAL
THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 267 (J. A. Bargh, ed. 2007); see also PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://
implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.html (last visited June 27, 2015).
9. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://www.projectimplicit.net/about.html (last visited May 6,
2015). The test may also start by asking participants a series of questions designed to measure
explicitly held beliefs. See Preliminary Information, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard
.edu/implicit/takeatest.html (last visited June 27, 2015). For example, in a gender-career IAT,
the test asks how much the participant associates career and family with males and females. In a
race IAT, the test asks participants whether they have a preference for European Americans over
African-Americans. See UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE, http://www.understandingprejudice.
org/iat/index2.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).
10. Cheryl Staats, State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2013, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE
STUDY OF RACE AND ETHICS 1, 27 (2013), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/docs/SOTS-Implicit
_Bias.pdf; Nosek et al., supra note 8; Project Implicit, supra note 8.
11. Staats, supra note 10, at 25.
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based on race.12 Furthermore, the time differentials in the IAT sorting
tasks “have been found to be statistically significant,” i.e., likely not “due
to random chance.”13
As the IAT shows, our brains are wired to take in information and
form social “schemas,” mental theories about how we expect people and
social situations to operate.14 Schemas are critical to our survival: our
brains simply encounter too much information on a day-to-day basis to
process it all. Our brains need short cuts to help process the onslaught of
information efficiently and to anticipate and prepare us for contingen-
cies.15 For instance, as children we learn that a snarling dog is a threat. We
might learn this through experience (getting bitten by an angry dog) or
through other informational sources (an adult telling us to be careful of
dogs or a cartoon showing a character getting chased by a dog). Once we
learn this, if we see a snarling dog, we automatically rely on a schema of
“snarling dog as dangerous” and retreat. Therefore, there is no need to re-
learn that a snarling dog is dangerous every time we encounter one. Our
ability to rely on shortcuts, such as “snarling dog is dangerous,” is critical
to our survival (and our ability to avoid dog bites!).
Yet, while some schemas are necessary for our survival, other
schemas may be based on inaccurate or incomplete information. For in-
stance, the media and societal narratives have trained most people’s brains
to react to individuals of other races in differing ways.16 While we might
consciously reject racism, impressions learned when young and decades of
watching the news, TV shows, or otherwise simply engaging in society
engrain stereotypes in our brains and contribute to the development of
12. Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18
EUR. REV. OF SOC. PSYCH. 1, 17 (2007).
13. Staats, supra note 10, at 25.
14. Id. at 11.
15. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that categorizing information and relying on gen-
eralizations play a role in our ability to process information. See Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp.
2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that “[t]here is [an] increasing recognition of the natural
human tendency to categorize information and engage in generalizations, of which stereotyping
is a part, as a means of processing the huge amount of information confronting individuals on a
daily basis; these unconscious processes can lead to biased perceptions and decision-making even
in the absence of conscious animus or prejudice against any particular group”), aff’d sub nom.,
Chin v. Carey, 160 F. App’x. 633 (9th Cir. 2005).
16. For instance, as discussed in Section IV.A.2., Whites primed by watching stereotypic
“portrayal[s] of African Americans [on television] are later more likely to judge a Black defen-
dant [as] guilty of an assault.” UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 27 (Scott
Plous, ed.) (2003) (citing T.E. Ford, Effects of Stereotypical Television Portrayals of African-Americans
on Person Perception, 60 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 266 (1997)); see also Jerry Kang, Bits of Bias, in IMPLICIT
RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 132, 135-39 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, eds., 2012)
(discussing stereotypes in media and the neural and emotional responses to viewing those
stereotypes).
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schemas. The media help create stereotypes,17 for instance, by frequently
portraying Whites as hardworking professionals, while often portraying
Blacks as athletes and criminals, Hispanics as illegal immigrants and drug
dealers, and Asians as scientific geniuses and classical musicians. Overriding
these schemas and stereotypes is possible, but given the pervasiveness of the
messages reinforcing racial stereotypes, overriding schemas and stereotypes
about a social group requires consistent effort.
In addition to a number of other factors, research shows that implicit
bias is most likely to taint our actions when we have more discretion or
must make a quick decision. These are situations in which we may unwit-
tingly rely on schematic shortcuts because we do not have guidelines by
which to make a decision or time to process new information fully.18 The
following sections take a closer look at how these factors (discretion, time
pressures, etc.)—and implicit bias in general—can impact the electoral
process.
II. IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
Superficially, the administration of elections and the voting process
seem strictly regulated with little room for election officials to exercise
discretion. A closer look, however, reveals multiple points at which elec-
tion officials make choices,19 from where to place new voting machines to
how to assess a voter’s identification to how much assistance to offer a
disabled, elderly, or minority voter. With each use of discretion, the risk of
implicit bias infecting the electoral process increases.20 This section ana-
lyzes how implicit bias might influence decisions made at various stages of
the election process.21
17. Stereotypes are “standardized and simplified belief[s] about the attributes of a social
group.” Staats, supra note 10, at 77. Although stereotypes and schemas are interrelated, they are
distinct concepts. See id. at 11.
18. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1142 (2012).
For more information on factors exacerbating implicit bias, see Strategies to Reduce the Influence of
Implicit Bias, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/
Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_Strategies_033012.ashx (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
19. See Ariel R. White, Noah L. Nathan & Julie K. Faller, What Do I Need to Vote?
Bureaucratic Discretion and Discrimination by Local Election Officials, American Political Science Review,
109 AM. PO. SCI. REV. 129, 129 (2014) (“Like other street-level bureaucrats, local election
administrators often have considerable discretion in how they manage the election system, oper-
ate with little direct oversight from state officials, and are frequently time and resource
constrained.”).
20. See Michelle Wilde Anderson & Victoria C. Plaut, Property Law: Implicit Bias and the
Resilience of Spatial Colorlines, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 25, 30 (Justin D.
Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).
21. See generally IMPLICIT BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith
eds., 2012) (discussing implicit bias in many areas of law but not offering an analysis of implicit
bias in voting rights or election law). This collection of essays was the inspiration and source of
much of the information in this Section.
28 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:23
A. Resource Allocation
Although social psychologists have not directly tested decision-mak-
ing in the allocation of election resources, experiments examining how
people make decisions when allocating resources in other areas are instruc-
tive. For instance, in a study by Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore,
researchers asked participants, university students in an introductory psy-
chology class, to make recommendations regarding how to implement a
twenty percent budget cut to student groups on campus.22 The researchers
also asked participants to complete a survey measuring their explicit atti-
tudes about people from different racial groups.23 In addition, the research-
ers gave the participants an IAT test measuring their implicit attitudes
regarding Jews, Asians, and Blacks.24 The researchers found that “implicit
biases predicted economic discrimination toward Jews, Asians, and Blacks,
and that the stereotype IAT was either an equal or superior predictor,
compared with explicit attitudes.”25 In other words, participants demon-
strating higher implicit bias against Jews, Asians, and Blacks on the IAT
were more likely to cut the budget of student groups associated with those
social identities than their expressed attitudes would have indicated.26
Researchers in a different study tested White participants’ willingness
to place a chemical plant in predominantly minority or White neighbor-
hoods.27 The researchers surveyed half of the White participants regarding
their receptivity to placing a chemical plant in a majority White neighbor-
hood and half of the White participants regarding their receptivity to plac-
ing the chemical plant in a majority Black neighborhood.28 The
researchers also provided half of the participants with “local and national
housing cost information,” and surveyed the participants’ perceptions of
the neighborhoods, such as the degree to which “power plants and incin-
erators already existe[d] nearby,” the “perceived neighborhood house val-
ues,” and the “perceived socioeconomic status of residents.”29 The
researchers found that, “participants were less likely to oppose the plant
when the neighborhood was black than when it was white – regardless of
22. Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Bias Test, 10
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 363-65 (2007).
23. Id. at 365.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 368.
26. Id.; see also Justin D. Levinson, Corporations Law, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS
THE LAW 156, 157 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (describing the Rudman
& Ashmore studies and extrapolating the findings to “corporate decisions regarding charitable
contributions”).
27. Wilde Anderson & Plaut, supra note 20, at 35 (discussing Courtney M. Bonam, Deval-
uing Black Space: Black Locations as Targets of Housing and Environmental Discrimination (Aug. 2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with Stanford University)).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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housing cost information – even when controlling for participants’ percep-
tions of house values and socioeconomic status, their concern for the envi-
ronment, and their explicit feelings toward blacks.”30 Participants who
believed they treated people from all races equally were still more likely to
be comfortable placing a chemical plant in a minority neighborhood rather
than in a White neighborhood.31
These experiments illustrate how implicit biases can impact decisions
regarding resource allocation and can implicate how election resources are
distributed. County officials rely on their discretion when deciding how to
disburse election resources in a range of situations, from determining
where to create new polling locations to deciding which localities receive
new voter machines. For example, up to 15,000 people left the polls with-
out voting on Election Day 2004 in Columbus, Ohio,32 in large part due
to decisions by officials about who was likely to vote. Franklin County
officials allocated the machines “according to instinct and science.”33 Offi-
cials “apparently . . . assumed that in a poor neighborhood, turnout would
be low.”34 Their failure to provide additional resources to certain neigh-
borhoods led to long lines, from which many discouraged voters turned
away before being able to cast their ballots.35
Implicit bias may also impact which polling locations get newer vot-
ing machines. A 2003 lawsuit36 brought by the Southwest Voter Registra-
tion Education Project and other groups noted that certain voting
devices—which were prone to error at twice the rate of newer voting
devices—were still in use in six largely minority counties in California.
While eighty-one percent of African-American and sixty-seven percent
Latino voters live in counties with “obsolete” machines in California, only
fifty-nine percent of White voters live in counties with outdated ma-
30. Id.
31. Bonham, supra note 27, at 56-62.
32. Adam Cohen, No One Should Have to Stand in Line for 10 Hours to Vote, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/26/opinion/26tue4.html?_r=0.
33. Michael Powell & Peter Slevin, Several Factors Contributed to ‘Lost’ Voters in Ohio,
WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64737-
2004Dec14.html?nav=rss_politics/elections/2004.
34. Sasha Abramsky, Just Try Voting Here: 11 of America’s Worst Places to Cast a Ballot (or
Try), MOTHER JONES (Oct. 2006), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/09/just-try-
voting-here-11-americas-worst-places-cast-ballot-or-try.
35. See Powell & Slevin, supra note 33. Even though the allocation decisions might have
been made in part by African-American election officials, it is important to remember that
African-Americans and other minorities can also be susceptible to stereotypes and implicit racial
bias. See FAQs, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/
faqs.html (last visited July 2, 2015) (noting that Black Americans and other minorities can also be
susceptible to stereotypes and implicit racial bias).
36. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2003).
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chines.37 Although intentional discrimination may still be a factor behind
why polling places that serve majority-minority populations end up with
older machines, when other, whiter counties receive newer voting ma-
chines, experiments regarding how implicit bias can impact resource allo-
cation decisions indicate that unconscious biases could also be playing a
role.38
B. Pre-Election Day: Voter Registration and Voter Qualifications
Election officials may also exercise discretion during voter registra-
tion and other steps in the election process requiring individuals to com-
plete forms. Officials processing voter registration applications, absentee
ballot requests, and other election related documents must ensure the
forms are accurately completed.39 Although this would appear to entail
minimal discretion, these officials must make a number of decisions. For
instance, they must ensure that the name and address on each form are
legible, so the information can be added to the registrar’s database of vot-
ers.40 Similarly, when considering an absentee ballot, the registrar or other
staff member must ensure that the information sufficiently matches the
data already on file for the voter and, if it does not, the election official
may need to determine whether the mistake is cause to invalidate the bal-
lot.41 Is listing a “street” instead of an “avenue” in one’s address a “mate-
rial” difference and sufficient grounds upon which to reject the
application? Is forgetting to include the suffix to one’s name—Junior or
Senior—a material omission?42 Although many states provide guidance on
37. John M. Border, The Nation; The Problem Isn’t the Punch-cards. It’s the People, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/21/weekinreview/the-nation-the-
problem-isn-t-the-punch-cards-it-s-the-people.html.
38. Although election officials making resource decisions might argue that they are simply
relying on residential factors, not race, at least one court has recognized that residency may be a
proxy for race. See Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that a
“juror’s area of residence was not a valid racially-neutral justification for peremptory challenge
because court found it to be ‘a stereotypical racial reason.’ ” (quoting United States v. Bishop,
959 F.2d 820, 826–28 (9th Cir. 1992))), aff’d sub nom., Chin v. Carey, 160 F. App’x 633 (9th
Cir. 2005).
39. Adam Liptak, Error and Fraud at Issue as Absentee Voting Rises, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/us/politics/as-more-vote-by-mail-faulty-ballots-
could-impact-elections.html?_r=0 (discussing election officials’ discretion in considering
whether a voter’s signature on an absentee ballot matches that on file and determining whether
to count an absentee ballot); Voter Verification Without ID Documents, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-verifica
tion-without-id-documents.aspx (noting that “[m]any states that require signatures or signed
affidavits mandate that elections officials compare these signatures to the signatures on voters’
registration forms”).
40. Liptak, supra, note 39.
41. Id.
42. In 2014, Virginia’s State Board of Elections considered whether the omission of a
generational suffix or street identifier was material, and cause to invalidate an absentee ballot.
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some of these questions, officials processing applications must often rely on
their own discretion when making more marginal decisions.43 Research
into implicit bias indicates that the risk is high that these seemingly minis-
terial decisions may be infected by unconscious biases.
Studies show that how an individual reviews a document can be in-
fluenced by unconscious biases, even when he or she is not directly inter-
acting with the person who completed the document or form. A 2014
study found that, when grading the same memorandum, law firm partners
gave lower grades when the author was a hypothetical Black law student
than when the author was a hypothetical White law student.44 The study
found that law firm partners identified more “objective” mistakes (i.e.
spelling and grammar mistakes) in the memorandum written by the fic-
tional African-American summer associate and also had more “subjective”
critiques (i.e. regarding the overall analysis) than in the memorandum
written by the fictional White associate.45
Similarly, election officials may unintentionally treat potential voters’
registration applications and requests for absentee ballots differently based
on the perceived race of the voter. A registrar may identify more “objec-
tive” mistakes and give more weight to them when reviewing an election-
related document submitted by a minority, rather than when reviewing
one submitted by a White person, as was the case with law firm partners
reviewing the hypothetical summer associate’s memorandum. There is evi-
dence that this has, in fact, occurred. Testimony from Windy Boy v. Big
Horn County,46 described how county officials subjected “Native Ameri-
cans to a more technical and more difficult voter registration process than
whites”47 and that county officials “became hypertechnical . . . and looked
for minor errors in [Native American] registration applications and used
them as an excuse to refuse to allow registration.”48
Likewise, a 2012 report on treatment of Native American voters in
Arizona found that staff in recorders’ offices in Arizona routinely placed
Material omissions from Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots, 1 VA. ADMIN. CODE §20-45-40
(proposed June 16, 2014), http://www.townhall.virginia.gov/L/ViewXML.cfm?textid=8831.
43. See Liptak, supra note 39; see also Florida Is Developing New Rules For Counting Mis-
marked Ballots, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/12/us/florida-
is-developing-new-rules-for-counting-mismarked-ballots.html (discussing the need for rules to
help election officials determine a voter’s intent in the wake of the Florida election debacle with
spoilt ballots in 2000).
44. Arin N. Reeves, Written in Black & White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized
Perceptions of Writing Skills, NEXIONS, (April 2014), http://www.nextions.com/wp-content/
files_mf/14151940752014040114WritteninBlackandWhiteYPS.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Windy Boy v. Big Horn Cnty., 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986).
47. Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 643, 687 (2006) (citing Windy
Boy, 647 F. Supp. at 1008).
48. Windy Boy, 647 F. Supp. at 1008.
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Native voters on “suspense lists” (similar to inactive lists)49 when the re-
corder was not satisfied that an applicant sufficiently clarified his or her
address.50 There are few guidelines on what should constitute an adequate
address in Arizona;51 instead, it is left to the recorder’s discretion and may
be influenced by implicit bias.52
Implicit biases might also influence the degree of assistance that elec-
tion officials, elected representatives, and political campaigns offer in re-
sponse to voters’ questions in the weeks leading up to an election. A study
from the University of Southern California tested the responses of state
legislators to inquiries about voter identification laws.53 The researchers
sent emails to 1,871 state legislators in fourteen states in the two weeks
before the 2012 elections.54 Their emails read:
Hello (Representative/Senator NAME),
My name is (voter NAME) and I have heard a lot in the news
lately about identification being required at the polls. I do not
have a driver’s license. Can I still vote in November? Thank
you for your help.
Sincerely,
(voter NAME)55
The experimenters changed the names in the emails they sent, so
that one group of legislators received the email from a “Jacob Smith”
49. A “suspense list” generally refers to a list of voters with missing or incomplete infor-
mation. Their registration status may be put on hold while the election official waits to receive
the missing information from the voter. See, e.g., State of Arizona’s Election Procedures Manual,
ARIZ. DEP’T. OF STATE, at 35 (2015), www.azsos.gov/sites/azsos.gov/files/election_procedure_
manual_2014.pdf.
50. Aura Bogado, How Native Voters Are Routinely Disenfranchised in Arizona, COLORLINES
(Oct. 12, 2012), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/10/democracy_in_suspense_why_
arizonas_native_voters_are_in_peril.html (citing an interview with an Arizona election official
explaining that voters have to “clarify their physical address to [her] satisfaction.”). Because
many Native voters live in rural areas in Arizona and other southwest states, many of these voters
do not have traditional street addresses but rather use descriptions (i.e. cross streets) or draw maps
when registering to vote. See id.
51. See e.g., ARIZ. DEP’T. OF STATE, supra note 49.
52. Id. (citing an interview with an Arizona election official explaining that voters have to
“clarify their physical address to [her] satisfaction.”).
53. Matthew S. Mendez & Christian R. Grose, Revealing Discriminatory Intent: Legislator
Preferences, Voter Identification, and Responsiveness Bias, UNIV. OF S. CAL. CLASS RESEARCH PA-
PER NO. 14-17 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422596 (last vis-
ited June 26, 2015); see also Christopher Ingraham, Study Finds Strong Evidence for Discriminatory
Intent Behind Voter ID Laws, WASH. POST (June 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/06/03/study-finds-strong-evidence-for-discriminatory-intent-be
hind-voter-id-laws/.
54. Mendez & Grose, supra note 53, at 14-15.
55. Ingraham, supra note 53.
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while another group received the email from a “Santiago Rodriguez.”56
Because no state actually required a driver’s license to vote, “legislators
really could have simply responded with a ‘yes’” and explained that driv-
ers’ licenses were not required to vote.57 Instead, “[t]he researchers found
that legislators who had supported voter ID laws were much more likely to
respond to ‘Jacob Smith’ than to ‘Santiago Rodriguez.’ ”58 As the re-
searchers note, this provides strong evidence that voter identification laws
were enacted with consciously held discriminatory intent.59 But, the study
also noted that even those legislators who did not back photo identifica-
tion laws responded less frequently to correspondents with Hispanic
names, although this difference in response rates was less significant.60 This
difference in response rates may be the result of an unconscious association
of minority voters with “unlikely” or “ineligible” voters. Another study
found that both elected and appointed election officials—the latter pre-
sumably having less direct political incentive to dissuade certain popula-
tions of voters from casting their ballot—responded less frequently to
emails asking about voter identification requirements sent from a fictional
Latino person rather than a fictional White person.61
These studies bear similarities with research in the education and em-
ployment settings showing a difference in responses based on nothing more
than whether a name sounds “ethnic.” One study found that professors
replied more often to requests by students asking to meet when the re-
quests were from students with generically “White-sounding” names than
names associated with minorities.62 Another study found that recruiters
called job applicants with “White names” fifty percent more often than
those with typical African-American names, even when their resumes
were identical.63 Given that law firm partners,64 university professors,65
and employment recruiters66 have demonstrated bias based on the per-
ceived ethnicity of an individual’s name, there is reason to question
56. Mendez & Grose, supra note 53, at 15-16.
57. Ingraham, supra note 53.
58. Id.
59. Mendez & Grose, supra note 53, at 21-22.
60. Id. at 21.
61. White et al., supra note 19, at 130, 139.,
62. Katherine L. Milkman, Modupe Akinola & Dolly Chugh, What Happens Before? A
Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway into
Organizations, J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. (2015), https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/
apl-0000022.pdf.
63. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV.  991,
992 (2004).
64. Reeves et al., supra note 44.
65. Milkman et al., supra note 62.
66. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 63.
34 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:23
whether election officials are free from the influence of similar implicit
biases.
C. Election Day Voting
Implicit biases may also affect Election Day decisions made by poll
workers and election officials. For example, a survey of the 2008 elections
found that in states where poll workers are not required or allowed to
request identification, the race of both the poll worker and the voter affects
the rate at which voters from different racial groups are asked for identifi-
cation, with Black and Hispanic voters being asked to “show ‘picture ID’
more often than Whites.”67
Psychological research concerning how we perceive and recognize
individuals from an in-group versus an out-group raises important ques-
tions about how implicit biases might influence the election process in
states with photo identification requirements.68 The “other race effect”
(ORE) or “cross race effect” (CRE) describes the phenomenon in which a
member of one ethnic group is better able to recognize and “individu-
ate”69 between members of his or her own ethnic group than between
members of other ethnic groups.70 Researchers have proposed a number of
theories to explain this phenomenon. Under the categorization-individua-
tion and perceptual expertise models, an individual who grows up with
consistent and sustained exposure to his or her own race is trained to indi-
viduate faces and remember names of people with the same racial back-
ground.71 These theories are supported by research showing that
individuals “who grew up in diverse neighborhoods” are better able to
individuate members of other races.72 Social-cognitive theories, on the
67. R. Michael Alvarez et al., 2008 Survey of the Performance of American Elections Final
Report i, ii, 42-46 (2009); see also Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Adminis-
tration, and the Problem of Implicit Bias, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 20 (2009); Lonna Rae Atkeson
et al., A New Barrier to Participation: Heterogeneous Application of Voter Identification Policies, 29 ELEC-
TORAL STUD. 1, 66 (2010).
68. An in-group is a group in which an individual is a member, whereas an outgroup is a
group in which one is not. UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 16,
at 10.
69. “Individuation” has multiple definitions within the field of social psychology but, in
general, may refer to one’s reliance on personal attributes, such as personality or behavior, to
form an impression of another person. Galen Bodenhausen, C. Neil Macrae & Jeffrey W. Sher-
man, On the Dialects of Discrimination: Dual Process in Social Stereotypes, in DUAL-PROCESS THEO-
RIES IN SOC. PSYCHOL. 271, 279 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
70. W. Grady Rose, Recognizing the Other: Training’s Ability to Improve Other Race Individu-
ation 1, 8 (May 2013) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Georgia Southern University) (on file with
Georgia Southern University).
71. Id. at 8-9.
72. Id. (citing Kurt Hugenberg, Steven G. Young, Michael J. Bernstein & Donald F.
Sacco, The Categorization-Individuation Model: An Integrative Account of the Other-Race Recognition
Deficit, 117 PSYCHOL. REV. 1168 (2010)).
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other hand, hold that when an individual first encounters another person
he or she automatically categorizes that person “as belonging to either our
own social in-group or a social out-group.”73 Because members of an in-
group are more “socially important,” our brains recognize and store infor-
mation regarding in-group members’ individuating characteristics, while
our memories struggle to store this information for out-group members.74
Additional theories explaining the CRE have also been developed.75
To explore the impact of the cross race effect and implicit bias on
Election Day, it is a useful to hypothesize what might happen when
“Jane,” a poll worker in a state with a new photo identification law, checks
in her first voter. Jane is a White retiree, from a largely White, middle class
neighborhood. Jane grew up attending largely White schools, and most of
her friends are White. Jane would never call herself a racist and says the
color of someone’s skin does not matter to her. Jane’s first voter is a Black
man named Jamal Jones. What does psychological research on the subcon-
scious suggest will happen when Jane attempts to check Jamal in to vote?
First, Jane will likely experience an increased rate of neurological ac-
tivity, and her pupils will dilate.76 In a study mapping the amygdala (the
area of the brain that processes emotional information, such as fear, and
helps make snap judgments), researchers found that when participants in a
study were shown Black faces, but not White faces, they experienced an
increase in amygdala activity.77 The researchers concluded that, subcon-
sciously at least, participants’ brains processed Black faces as possible
threats.78 When Jamal approaches Jane at the poll workers’ table, Jane’s
amygdala may activate, sending fear signals and causing her eyes to dilate.
In addition to experiencing heightened neurological activity, the
cross race effect may create a situation in which Jane struggles to match
73. Kathleen L. Hourihan, Scott H. Fraundorf & Aaron S. Benjamin, Same Faces, Different
Labels: Generating the Cross-Race Effect in Face Memory With Social Category Information, 41 MEM-
ORY & COGNITION 1021, 1022 (2013).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1021-22; Rose, supra note 70, at 8. Other theories for the cross-race effect
include “perceptual-expertise” theories which “rely on the fact that most people have more
experience perceiving, encoding, and remembering faces from their own group” and demon-
strate that “[w]e therefore simply lack the skill to properly remember other-race faces because
we have not had sufficient experience to learn how to differentiate among other-race faces at the
time of encoding.” Hourihan et al., supra note 73, at 1021-22.
76. A study by Goldinger et al. found that when participants viewed facial images of
members of another race their pupils dilated, indicating greater cognitive effort. Stephen D.
Goldinger, Yi He & Megan H. Papesh, Deficits in Cross-Race Face Learning: Insights from Eye
Movements and Pupillometry, 35 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL., LEARNING, MEMORY, AND
COGNITION 1105 (2009).
77. Charles Ogletree, Robert J. Smith & Johanna Wald, Coloring Punishment: Implicit Social
Cognition and Criminal Justice, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 20, at 45,
48 (citing Michael D. Liberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race-related Amygdala Activity in
African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 720 (2005)).
78. Id.
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Jamal to his picture. Jane wants to do her job properly, but she has always
had difficulties with recognizing “Africans” because they “all look alike.”
Jane would not be alone in experiencing difficulty recognizing and indi-
viduating between people of another race, as studies indicate that, when
asked to distinguish individuals, participants are more likely to study faces
of other races longer than faces belonging to their own race.79
While Jane may ordinarily be able to override the cross race effect,
circumstances on Election Day are ripe to exacerbate unintended reliance
on implicit biases. Psychologists have established that people are more
likely to rely on stereotypes and be influenced by unconscious assumptions
when under stress or a tight deadline.80 This makes sense because stereo-
types are generalizations, and when one does not have time to investigate a
situation fully before making a decision—whether that be a decision to
hire someone or to give someone a provisional or regular ballot—our
brains may automatically rely on generalizations or stereotypes.81 As dis-
cussed below, undue reliance on stereotypes and implicit biases may mean
that Jamal and other minority voters are more likely to be handed provi-
sional ballots.
D. Assisting Voters and Provisional Ballots
Implicit biases may also influence whether poll workers decide to
assist certain individuals on Election Day. That poll workers’ decisions may
be impacted by implicit biases on Election Day is particularly disconcerting
for two reasons. First, the amount of effort a poll worker invests in recon-
ciling an issue for a voter often determines whether that voter casts a regu-
lar or a provisional ballot.82 Second, Election Day is a voter’s last chance to
cast his or her ballot. If implicit biases contribute to a situation in which a
voter is denied a regular ballot, the harm is irreparable.
Information about the assistance offered to White voters as compared
to minority voters is not readily available. We do not know if poll workers
spend more time trying to reconcile differences between a name on an ID
and a name in a poll book for some voters than for others. Nevertheless,
research from other areas regarding assistance is instructive. A study by the
79. Jonathan G. Tullis, Aaron S. Benjamin & Xiping Liu, Self-Pacing Study of Faces of
Different Races: Metacognitive Control Over Study Does Not Eliminate the Cross-Race Recognition Ef-
fect, 42 MEMORY & COGNITION 863, 863 (2014).
80. See NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 18, at 4.
81. Id.
82. A provisional ballot is used when there is an issue regarding the voter’s eligibility.
Individuals voting with a provisional ballot must frequently follow up with the county registrar
or with another election official with additional identification or other information. Provisional
Voting, PROJECT VOTE, http://projectvote.org/provisional-voting.html (last visited Mar. 18,
2015). Because many times provisional ballots are cast at the wrong precinct, are not completed
properly, or require additional action on the part of the voter to confirm their identity, they are
frequently not counted. Id.
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U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in 2000 found that
“approximately one in five Black or Hispanic home seekers did not receive
assistance and information that were provided to equally qualified whites,”
even though minority and White home seekers presented equal qualifica-
tions.83 Minority home seekers were less likely to be offered the “chance
to inspect units,” were more likely to be denied “information about availa-
ble units,” and were more likely to be “steer[ed] towards [housing] in
minority neighborhoods” than were Whites.84 Minority home seekers
were also more likely to be offered “inferior financial terms and inferior
assistance and follow-up with housing transactions.”85
Similarly, other studies examined the help given to a shopper who
drops a bag of groceries.86 In some cases, the “shopper” was White; in
other cases, the “shopper” was Black.87 In one study, researchers found
that, while “whites and blacks were offered assistance in equal numbers,
the amount of assistance offered was not equal.”88 The study revealed that
although “70% of the time white subjects helped black women, they gave
only perfunctory help, picking up only a few packages.” However, “63%
of the time that white subjects were aiding white women, the subjects gave
complete help, picking up all of the groceries.”89
Studies demonstrating that minorities frequently receive less assis-
tance than Whites suggest that poll workers might unintentionally offer
less assistance to minority voters than to White voters. A voter who at-
tempts to cast a ballot on Election Day might run into any number of
problems that could be resolved with help from a cooperative poll worker.
If a voter lacks the proper form of identification, a poll worker could spend
time explaining what is acceptable. If a voter’s name is not found on the
voting roll, a poll worker could call other voting locations to determine if
the voter’s name appears on the roll at a different polling location. If a
voter needs additional assistance because he or she is not a native English
speaker or is disabled, a poll worker’s actions might contribute to how
comfortable the voter may feel when asking for help. If a poll worker
unintentionally provides less assistance to traditionally marginalized voters
as compared to others because of the poll worker’s implicit biases, there
will be a disproportionate impact on minorities’ votes being counted.
83. Wilde Anderson & Plaut, supra note 20, at 29.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899,
911-12 (1993) (citing Lauren G. Wispe & Harold B. Freshley, Race, Sex, and Sympathetic Helping
Behavior: The Broken Bag Caper, 17 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 59, 62-65 (1971); Faye
Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature
Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 559 (1980)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 912.
89. Id.
38 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:23
There is evidence that this is the case, as a 2004 survey found that
Latino jurisdictions had the highest rates of provisional ballot use.90 Provi-
sional ballots are frequently used when there is an issue regarding the
voter’s eligibility and might not be counted because the voter must often
take additional steps (i.e. go to a different polling location or submit addi-
tional identification).91 It is impossible to know whether the decisions
made in the examples above might be influenced by implicit biases or by
the conscious intent to discriminate. The next sections discuss the legal
framework established to protect voters and posit that the “totality of the
circumstances” test established by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act pro-
vides an opportunity for courts to consider evidence of unconscious bias in
a “results” claim brought under that provision.92
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF VOTING RIGHTS
In 1965, Congress responded to the systemic disenfranchisement of
racial minorities by passing the Voting Rights Act (VRA).93 The Voting
Rights Act immediately changed the electoral landscape of the country. In
the years after the VRA was implemented, voter registration of African-
Americans increased dramatically. In Mississippi, for example, the number
of African-Americans registered to vote rose from just 6.7 percent to sixty
percent over the next three years.94
The Act included a number of provisions that worked together to
prevent discriminatory voting laws and practices, most important of which
were Sections 2 and 5. Section 5 required certain jurisdictions to obtain
preclearance from either the United States Attorney General or from a
three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia before implementing any change in voting practices or proce-
dures.95 In 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder,96 the Supreme Court effec-
90. Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem of
Implicit Bias, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 39-40 (2009) (citing Kimball W. Brace & Michael P.
McDonald, Final Report of the 2004 Election Day Survey 6-6 (2005)).
91. PROJECT VOTE, supra note 82.
92. 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301 (West 2015).
93. Id.
94. J. Mijin Cha, Registering Millions: The Success and Potential of the National Voter Registra-
tion Act at 20, DEMOS, http://www.demos.org/registering-millions-success-and-potential-na
tional-voter-registration-act-20 (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
95. 52 U.S.C.A. § 10305 (West 2015). Jurisdictions subject to Section 5 were determined
by a legislative formula in Section 4(b) designed to identify those jurisdictions based on a combi-
nation of the use of a prohibited “test or device” and low voter turnout in certain elections. 52
U.S.C.A. § 10304(b) (West 2015).
96. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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tively gutted Section 5,97 leaving Section 2 as the primary statutory means
of challenging discriminatory voting practices.98
Section 2, as amended in 1982, states:
(a) No voting . . . procedure shall be imposed . . . in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color . . . .
(b) A violation . . . is established, if based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes lead-
ing to nomination or election . . . are not equally open to
participation by [minorities] in that [minorities] have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to par-
ticipate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice.99
The “results” phrase and the “totality of the circumstances” standard were
expressly added by Congress in 1982, in response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden requiring plaintiffs to show
intentional discrimination in order to prove a voting rights violation under
Section 2.100 As a consequence of this amendment, there is no require-
ment that plaintiffs prove intentional discrimination to establish a Section 2
results violation (known as a “results test” claim).101
97. The Shelby Court ruled that Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, was unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 2631. Before the Court’s decision, Section 4(b) identified those jurisdictions subject
to Section 5 preclearance requirements due to a history of discrimination and low minority
turnout. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 10304 (West 2015). In Shelby, the Court found that the formula for
including states under 4(b) was outdated and no longer based on “current conditions.” Shelby
Cnty., Ala., 133 S. Ct. at  2629. Without a coverage formula, there are no jurisdictions subject to
Section 5. See id.
98. The First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments provide independent constitutional
bases for claims against discrimination in voting. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434
(1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617
(1982). Constitutional claims require proof of intentional discrimination. Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (“Proof of racially discrimina-
tory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”). A
Section 2 violation may be found without proof of intentional discrimination in “results” cases.
See infra note 99 and accompanying text. This Article focuses on Section 2 “results” claims.
99. 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301 (West 2015).
100. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). The language of the Voting
Rights Act closely tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment prior to the 1982 Amend-
ments. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/vot/intro/intro_b.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
101. “Under the ‘results test,’ plaintiffs are not required to demonstrate that the challenged
electoral law or structure was designed or maintained for a discriminatory purpose.” S. REP. No.
97-417, at 16; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (“Congress substantially
revised [Section] 2 [in 1982] to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing dis-
criminatory effect alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the ‘results test’ . . . .”); id.
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Courts have recognized two types of results test claims under Section
2: (1) vote access claims (otherwise known as “vote denial” or “ballot ac-
cess” claims), which concern prerequisites to voting and practices which
may limit a voter’s ability to access a ballot, cast that ballot, and have that
ballot fairly counted, and (2) vote dilution claims, which challenge prac-
tices weakening minority voting strength.102 Although a plaintiff bringing
a vote dilution results test claim must establish certain preconditions not
applicable to a vote access claim,103 both vote dilution and vote access
at 43-44  (“First and foremost, the [Senate] Report [for the 1982 amendment] dispositively
rejects the position of the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which required
proof that the contested electoral practice or mechanism was adopted or maintained with the
intent to discriminate against minority voters.”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991)
(“Thus, Congress made clear that a violation of [Section] 2 could be established by proof of
discriminatory results alone.”).
In addition to and apart from the results test, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is
violated if a challenged voting law or practice is shown to have been adopted with a racially
discriminatory purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420, 432 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“To violate the statute, however, these practices must be undertaken with an intent to discrimi-
nate or must produce discriminatory results); Garza v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 766
(9th Cir. 1990) (“Congress amended the Voting Rights act in 1982 to add language indicating
that the Act forbids not only intentional discrimination, but also any practice shown to have a
disparate impact on minority voting strength.”); S. REP. 97-417, at 27 (“The amendment . . . is
designed to make clear that plaintiffs need not prove a discriminatory purpose in the adoption or
maintenance of the challenged system of practice in order to establish a violation.”).
In order to prevail on a claim of racially discriminatory purpose, the evidence must
demonstrate that discriminatory purpose was one of the motivating factors, not necessarily the
primary one, underlying the official action. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (A plaintiff is not required “to prove that the
challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes . . . . When there is a proof
that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference
is no longer justified.”). “ ‘Discriminatory purpose,’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal citation
omitted).
Discriminatory purpose may be proven by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982). It does not require proof of invidious racial animus
(ill feelings toward minorities), but rather simply an intent to disadvantage minority citizens.
Garza, 918 F.2d at 778 n.1 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006) (noting that taking
away political opportunity because a minority group is about to exercise it “bears the mark of
intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal protection violation”). Our analysis in
this paper is limited to the applicability of implicit or unconscious bias evidence in “results” cases
under Section 2.
102. See e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 n.26 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied sub nom., Johnson v. Bush, 546 U.S. 1015 (2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)); Farrakhan
v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Farrakhan I”), overruled on other grounds, Far-
rakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Farrakhan II”).
103. In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986), a seminal voting rights case (dis-
cussed further below), the Court set forth three “preconditions” plaintiffs must meet in order to
bring a vote dilution results test claim under Section 2. These preconditions are: (1) the minority
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claims require a showing of more than just the “disproportionate racial
impact” of a practice.104 This is where the “totality of the circumstances”
standard comes into play. The “totality of the circumstances” analysis re-
quired by the Section 2 results standard “depends upon a searching practi-
cal evaluation of the ‘past and present reality,’ and on a ‘functional’ view of
the political process.”105 In conducting this analysis, a court “must assess
the impact of the contested structure of or practice on minority electoral
opportunities ‘on the basis of objective factors.’ ”106
In connection with the amendments to the VRA in 1982, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary issued a report suggesting factors for courts to
consider when assessing the “totality of the circumstances.”107 The Senate
factors include:
1. the “history of official voting-related discrimination in the
state or political subdivision”;
2. “the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized”;
3. the extent to which the “state or political subdivision” has
used “voting practices or procedures” that tend to “en-
hance the opportunity for discrimination against the mi-
nority group,” such as “unusually large election districts,
majority-vote requirements,” and prohibitions against bul-
let voting;
4. the exclusion of members of the minority group from can-
didate slating processes;
5. the extent to which minority group members bear the “ef-
fects of discrimination in areas such as education, employ-
ment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process”;
6. the use of “overt or subtle racial appeals” in political cam-
paigns; and
group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-mem-
ber district;” (2) the minority group is “politically cohesive;” and (3) “the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Id.
104. Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 695 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
remanded sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that “a bare statistical
showing of a disproportionate impact is not enough”); Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 896
(E.D. Wis. 2014).
105. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30).
106. Id. at 44 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 27) (internal citation omitted).
107. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982).
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7. “the extent to which members of the minority group have
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.”108
The Senate Judiciary Committee made clear that the factors listed are
not exclusive and that courts could consider additional factors in assessing
Section 2 claims.109 In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court applied the Senate
factors within the “totality of circumstances” and found that the overarch-
ing issue is whether the challenged practice “interacts with social and his-
torical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
Black and White voters.”110 As discussed in the next section, the totality of
the circumstances standard provides an opportunity for courts to consider
social science research regarding implicit bias as part of a results test claim.
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
While much of the research discussed thus far illustrates the deeply
engrained and subconscious nature of bias, the role of implicit bias in the
election process can be reduced through litigation strategies and policy
changes. This section first provides an overview of case law discussing im-
plicit bias. Next, it discusses possible ways that Section 2 “results” plaintiffs
may attempt to introduce implicit bias research into evidence as part of the
“totality of the circumstances.” Finally, this section considers several policy
changes that can be made at the state, county, and municipal levels to
reduce the impact of implicit biases on the election process.
A. The Legal Framework for Implicit Bias
1. Overview of Case Law Discussing Implicit Bias and Challenges to
Admitting Testimony on Implicit Bias
As previous literature has noted, courts have considered the potential
implications of implicit bias in a wide range of cases, from warrantless
108. Id. In addition to the factors listed above, the Senate Report and Supreme Court have
recognized additional factors that “in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs’
evidence to establish a violation.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37. These factors include “whether there
is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of
the members of the minority group” and “whether the policy underlying the state or political
subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous.” Id.
109. Id.; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 401 (2006).
110. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986). Although Gingles was a vote-dilution
case, Section 2 “prohibits all forms of voting discrimination.” Id. at 45 n.10. Courts have rou-
tinely applied the Senate factors in voter access cases. See, e.g., League of Women Voters v.
North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Ohio State Conference of NAACP
v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2014); Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 405-06
(9th Cir. 2012), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Arizona v. InterTribal Council of Arizona, 133 S.
Ct. 2247 (2013); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 309-10 (3d Cir. 1994); Operation
PUSH v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 1991).
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searches to jury selection to employment matters.111 For example, in the
context of discussing the reasonableness of a warrantless stop of a person
based on his “Hispanic appearance,” the Ninth Circuit recognized that
“racial stereotypes often infect our decision making processes only
subconsciously.”112
Courts have also discussed the impact of implicit bias in jury selec-
tion. In concurring with the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller-El v.
Dretke, a case involving a prosecutor’s discretion in striking jurors, Justice
Breyer cited social science articles discussing implicit bias and noted that
“ ‘[s]ubtle forms of bias are automatic, unconscious, and unintentional’
and ‘escape notice, even the notice of those enacting the bias.’ ”113 In
addition, the District Court for the Northern District of California dis-
cussed the effects of implicit bias on the jury process in Chin v. Runnels,
finding that “a growing body of social science recognizes the pervasiveness
of unconscious racial and ethnic stereotyping and group bias.”114 Ulti-
mately, the court denied Chin’s petition, noting that “the problem of un-
conscious bias has not yet been directly addressed by the [Supreme
Court].”115 Other courts have also discussed implicit bias in the jury selec-
tion process and jury deliberations.116
Courts have explored the implications of implicit bias in the employ-
ment arena more than in any other area of law and have relied on research
111. Much of the research on case law regarding implicit bias for this section was drawn
from Eva Paterson, Kimberly Thomas Rapp & Sara Jackson’s article, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection in the 21st Century: Building upon Charles Lawrence’s Vision to Mount A Contemporary
Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175 (2008) (discussing unconscious bias in
the courts); see also Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition
and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 442-44 (2007).
112. Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994). The court found that
the police officer acted in bad faith, but avoided determining the level of “self-awareness” of the
officer. Id. at 1442-43. The officer’s testimony indicated that he acted with at least a partially
explicit understanding of his motivations. Id. at 1443. The officer testified that he “decided to
stop the vehicle” based on a few factors, including the fact that “Gonzalez and his father ap-
peared to be Hispanic.” Id. But see Martinez Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916, 923 (8th Cir.
2013) (rejecting Ninth Circuit’s “bad faith” standard); Garcia-Torres v. Holder, 660 F.3d 333,
337 n.4 (8th Cir. 2011) (declining to adopt the Gonzalez-Rivera standard).
113. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 268 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting
Antony Page, Batson’s Blind Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 155, 161 (2005)); see also Paterson et al., supra note 111, at 1194 (2008).
114. Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d sub nom., Chin v.
Carey, 160 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2005). See Paterson et al., supra note 111, at 1194 for further
discussion.
115. Chin, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 908.
116. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors per-
ceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict
of guilt or innocence.”); State v. Tucker, 629 A.2d 1067, 1077–78 (1993) (explaining that an
“unconscious racial stereotype” may affect jury evaluation of defendant or witnesses”).
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on implicit bias and stereotyping to explain decisions made concerning
hiring and firing,117 promotions,118 and pay.119 In EEOC v. Inland Marine,
for example, the Ninth Circuit found that even when an employer’s prac-
tices were “harmless in appearance” and manifested discrimination “sub-
tly,” rather than “through a ‘scheme or plan,’ ” they could still “hide
subconscious attitudes, and perpetuate the effects of past discriminatory
practices.”120 In Kimble v. Wisconsin Department of Workplace Development,
the Eastern District of Wisconsin found that the defendant supervisor “be-
haved in a manner suggesting the presence of implicit bias.”121 In finding
that implicit bias tainted the defendant’s actions, the court pointed to the
defendant’s reluctance to interact with the plaintiff-employee, the speed
with which the defendant blamed the plaintiff for mistakes but not other
employees, and the defendant’s grudging acknowledgement of plaintiff’s
achievements when the defendant “readily praised like accomplishments”
of White employees, among other things.122 Although the legal standards
governing employment cases require proof that discrimination was a moti-
vating factor,123 unlike those governing Section 2 “results” claims, these
cases lend support to the proposition that evidence of subconscious bias
should be admissible in discrimination claims generally.
In admitting expert testimony on implicit bias, in both voting rights
and other civil rights cases, a major issue is whether experts will be re-
quired to connect their opinions to the specific facts of the case or whether
117. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that
“Title VII’s prohibition against ‘disparate treatment because of race’ extends both to employer
acts based on conscious racial animus and to employer decisions that are based on stereotyped
thinking or other forms of less conscious bias”).
118. See, e.g., Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981)
(explaining that a subtle “discriminatory attitude” cannot “serve as the basis for job-related deci-
sions in employment”).
119. See, e.g., EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 1984) (af-
firming the lower court’s finding that a company was responsible for maintaining “a two-tiered
wage structure” based on race, despite the fact that “[t]he company did not consciously set out
to establish” such a structure).
120. Id. at 1235-36; see also Lynn, 656 F.2d at 1343 n.5 (“Other concepts reflect a discrimi-
natory attitude subtly; the subtlety does not, however, make the impact less significant or less
unlawful. It serves only to make the courts’ task of scrutinizing attitudes and motivation, in order
to determine the true reason for employment decisions, more exacting.”).
121. Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 778 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
122. Id. at 777-78. But cf. Wells-Griffin v. St. Xavier Univ., 26 F. Supp. 3d 785, 793 (N.D.
Ill. 2014) (declining to infer that supervisors’ actions were attributable to implicit racial stereo-
types because, unlike the plaintiff in Kimble, Wells-Griffin failed to “provide evidence that her
treatment was different from other employees”).
123. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in the workplace
with respect to an individual’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race . . . or sex . . . ,” and provides that a complainant may establish
discrimination by demonstrating that race or sex “was a motivating factor . . . for the challenged
employment practice.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2015).
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they will be permitted to testify generally as to the phenomenon of im-
plicit bias. In Jones v. National Council of Young Men’s Christian Association,
the Northern District of Illinois blocked the introduction of expert testi-
mony by Dr. Anthony Greenwald, one of the creators of the IAT, finding
that even testimony just on the “general principles” of implicit bias must
be “adequately tied to the facts” of a specific case in order to be admissi-
ble.124 The Supreme Court similarly rejected expert testimony regarding
how stereotypes (but not “implicit bias” per se) might influence managers’
decisions in the Wal-Mart v. Dukes class action.125 The Court found that,
because the plaintiffs’ expert could not “determine with any specificity
how regularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in employment decisions
at Wal–Mart”—whether that be “0.5 percent or 95 percent of the em-
ployment decisions”—his testimony could be “safely disregarded.”126
The issue of whether such testimony is admissible will largely be
governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence on relevancy (Rules 401 and
402) and the Federal Rule of Evidence regarding “helpfulness” or reliabil-
ity (Rule 702). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Evidence provide support for the admissibility of
the general principles of the phenomenon of implicit bias:
[I]t might . . . be important in some cases for an expert to
educate the factfinder about general principles, without ever at-
tempting to apply these principles to the specific facts of the
case. For example, experts might instruct the factfinder on the
principles of thermodynamics, or bloodclotting, or on how fi-
nancial markets respond to corporate reports, without ever
knowing about or trying to tie their testimony into the facts of
the case. The amendment does not alter the venerable practice
of using expert testimony to educate the factfinder on general
principles. For this kind of generalized testimony, Rule 702
simply requires that: (1) the expert be qualified; (2) the testi-
mony address a subject matter on which the factfinder can be
assisted by an expert; (3) the testimony be reliable; and (4) the
testimony “fit” the facts of the case.127
124. Jones v. Nat’l Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns of the United States of Am.,
34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2014). But see Samaha v. Washington State Dep’t of Transp.,
No. CV-10-175-RMP, 2012 WL 11091843, at *4 (E.D. Wash. 2012) (admitting expert’s testi-
mony on implicit bias and finding such evidence “likely to provide the jury with information
that it will be able to use to draw its own conclusions”).
125. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (2011).
126. Id.
127. Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315
(9th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e must ensure that the proposed expert testimony is ‘relevant to the task at
hand,’ . . . i.e., that it logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party’s case.”); In re
Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1223 (D. Colo. 1998) (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard
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In Samaha v. Washington State Department of Transportation, the Eastern
District of Washington relied on the Advisory Committee Notes in admit-
ting expert testimony by the afore-mentioned Dr. Greenwald.128 The
court found that Dr. Greenwald’s opinions were admissible as they were
“based on reliable methodologies and consist of relevant subject matter”
and “likely to provide the jury with information that it will be able to use
to draw its own conclusions.”129 Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Price Waterhouse, the court found that “[t]estimony that educates a jury
on the concepts of implicit bias and stereotypes is relevant to the issue of
whether an employer intentionally discriminated against an employee.”130
Although Section 2 cases do not require proof of intent to discriminate,
the decision to admit Dr. Greenwald’s opinions of “general principles”
supports the admissibility of similar evidence in Section 2 cases.
Given that courts might consider the admissibility of expert testi-
mony on the IAT and implicit bias as a close question, plaintiffs wishing to
introduce evidence regarding unconscious bias in Section 2 cases must be
careful to satisfy the “fit” test and show a valid connection, or “good
grounds to extrapolate,” from psychological experiments to the situation
at hand.131 In addition, plaintiffs should be careful to present evidence re-
garding implicit bias as framed within the totality of the circumstances, as is
discussed in more depth in the following section.
2. The Results Test and Implicit Bias
The “totality of the circumstances” test and application of the Senate
factors present an opportunity for plaintiffs in a Section 2 results case to
introduce evidence of implicit bias in the voting process. As Justice Scalia
has noted, the “‘results’ criterion provides a powerful, albeit sometimes
blunt, weapon with which to attack even the most subtle forms of
discrimination.”132
As discussed above, the ultimate inquiry is whether the challenged
practice “interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an ine-
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)) (explaining that while the “fitness test” relates to
relevancy, “[t]he standard for fit is higher than bare relevance”).
128. Samaha, 2012 WL 11091843, at *4.
129. Id. Samaha was an employment discrimination case, and Dr. Greenwald’s testimony
was offered on the issue of discriminatory intent, which, again, is not an element of a “results”
claim under Section 2. Id.
130. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989)); see also
Rolls–Royce Corp. v. Heros, Inc., No. 3:07–CV–0739–D, 2010 WL 184313, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
2010) (finding expert testimony regarding the parts manufacture approval industry process admis-
sible “to teach the jury background information to understand the case”).
131. In re Paoli R.R., 35 F.3d at 743 (quoting Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 591 (1993)). But see Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1322 (finding expert testimony inadmissible
under the fit requirement because plaintiffs’ experts did not state that Bendectin caused the birth
defects, but merely stated that Bendectin could have caused the defects).
132. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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quality in the opportunities enjoyed” by minority voters.133 In this con-
text, explanation of the principles of implicit bias may shed considerable
light on the statistical analyses of disproportionate impact, demonstrating
that the disproportionality was “on account of race,”134 particularly where
subconscious bias might affect discretionary decisions like those dealing
with the allocation of electoral or voting resources (i.e. voting machines,
voter registration forms, electronic poll books, etc.) and the identities of
voters.
This was precisely how the court treated evidence in what appears to
be the only Section 2 case that admitted testimony of implicit bias.135 In
Farrakhan v. Gregoire,136 prisoners challenged Washington’s practice of dis-
enfranchising individuals convicted of felonies. Although, ultimately, Far-
rakhan was decided against the plaintiffs on a purely legal issue (i.e., that
felony disenfranchisement laws may only be challenged under Section 2 of
the VRA by meeting the high standard of showing “that the criminal jus-
tice system is infected by intentional discrimination” or that the legislature
enacted the “felon disenfranchisement law . . . with such intent”),137 its
handling of expert testimony on implicit bias is instructive nevertheless.
Specifically, the trial court considered the testimony of an expert to the
effect that the racial disproportionality in Washington State’s criminal jus-
tice system could not be explained by higher levels of criminal involve-
ment and, therefore, could not be explained other than by race.138 This
evidence—described by the trial court as consisting of reports regarding
both conscious and subconscious bias—was tied specifically to the statisti-
cal evidence in the case and did not consist only of “general principles” of
implicit bias.139
It would appear that, at a minimum, evidence of studies into implicit
bias, when tied to record evidence of disproportional impact or racially
polarized voting,140 should be readily admitted into evidence, as it would
be highly relevant to any number of the Senate factors. For example, when
considering the first Senate factor, “the history of official voting-related
discrimination,” plaintiffs might connect evidence of implicit bias research
133. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
134. 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301(a) (West 2015).
135. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006 WL 1889273, at *5-6 n.6
(E.D. Wash. 2006), rev’d and remanded, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 623
F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010).
136. Id.
137. Farrakhan, 623 F.3d at 993.
138. Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at *5-6.
139. Id. Cf. Jones v. Nat’l Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns of the United States of
Am., 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900-01 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (blocking testimony concerning “general
principles” of implicit bias because it was not tied to specific facts of case).
140. The Court discussed racially polarized voting at length in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986).
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to specific decisions concerning the allocation of election resources.
Courts considering cases like the 2003 California lawsuit challenging the
fact that minority communities were more likely to be provided “obso-
lete” voting machines than other communities141 could benefit from testi-
mony regarding the impact of implicit biases on resource allocation
decisions.
As with the other Senate factors, factor two—which deals with the
existence of racial polarization in voting or the extent to which voters vote
along racial lines—is not required for a successful results test vote access
claim.142 Senate factor two, however, is a prime example of in-group bias.
“In-group bias designates favoritism toward groups to which one be-
longs.”143 In the voting context, this contributes to racially polarized elec-
tions in which Whites vote for White candidates and minorities vote for
candidates who share their race.144 Courts may consider evidence regard-
ing implicit bias and in-group favoritism to provide context for their as-
sessment of the second Senate factor and their consideration of whether
and why a jurisdiction is racially polarized within the totality of the
circumstances.
Senate factor five asks “the extent to which members of the minority
group . . . bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effec-
tively in the political process.”145 Advocates considering Senate factor five
can draw on research showing how unconscious bias impacts minorities in
terms of their education,146 employment,147 and health148 to establish how
the effects of both explicit and unconscious discrimination “hinder” the
“ability [of minorities] to participate in the political process.”149 For ex-
ample, studies showing how implicit bias contributes to patterns in which
students of color are disproportionately punished, graded more harshly,
and ultimately less likely to go on to higher education than White stu-
141. See supra Section II.A.; Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914,
917 (9th Cir. 2003).
142. As mentioned above, while a showing of racially polarized voting is not required in
Section 2 results test claims challenging vote access, it is one of the three Gingles preconditions
plaintiffs must satisfy in vote dilution cases. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 49-51.
143. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006).
144. See generally Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, Implicit Bias, Election ‘08, and the
Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659 (2010) (explaining racial disparities in
Congress and voting patterns in the 2008 presidential election as products of racial bias).
145. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 27-30 (1982).
146. See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil et al., The Science of Equality, Volume 1: Addressing Implicit
Bias, Racial Anxiety, and Stereotype Threat in Education and Health Care, PERCEPTION INST. (Nov.
2014), http://perception.org/app/uploads/2014/11/Science-of-Equality-111214_web.pdf.
147. See, e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 63, at 1011.
148. See, e.g., Godsil et al., supra note 146.
149. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982).
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dents150 can be tied to other studies showing that those without a college
degree are less likely to vote regularly.151 Demonstrating such a link be-
tween implicit bias in education and other arenas (employment, health,
etc.), and the “ability [of minorities] to participate effectively in the polit-
ical process,” is one way advocates can frame a discussion of Senate factor
five.152
Depending on the racial appeals made in a particular campaign, evi-
dence regarding subconscious “priming” might be especially relevant to
plaintiffs considering Senate factor six, the use of “overt or subtle racial
appeals” in political campaigns.153 Research shows that priming—which
“takes place when an idea, image, or association is activated or made sali-
ent”154—can have a significant impact on one’s decisions and actions. For
instance, researchers have found that men primed with a sexist television
commercial later judged female job applicants more harshly.155 Similarly,
Whites primed by watching stereotypic portrayals of African-Americans
on television were “more likely to [later] judge a Black defendant [as]
guilty of an assault.”156
In the context of an election, subtle priming could have notable re-
sults. Take, as an example, the Willie Horton advertisement run in 1988 by
the George H.W. Bush presidential campaign against Democratic oppo-
nent Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts.157 The advertisement
featured intimidating photos of Horton, who committed robbery and rape
while on a furlough from prison in Massachusetts.158 One Democratic
strategist argued that the Horton advertisement “changed the course of
that race . . . . [I]t made white Americans—especially white
southerners—raise an eyebrow and think, ‘We can’t have a man from Mas-
sachusetts releasing quote black criminals all across the country and letting
them rape our white women and children.’ ”159 While it cannot be deter-
mined exactly what impact the ad had on voters, Dukakis’ standing in the
150. Godsil et al., supra note 146, at 34-36.
151. Who Votes, Who Doesn’t, And Why, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 18, 2006), http:/
/www.people-press.org/2006/10/18/who-votes-who-doesnt-and-why/.
152. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982).
153. Id.
154. UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 16, at 558.
155. Id. at 27 (citing Rudman & Borginda, The Afterglow of Construct Accessibility: The Be-
havioral Consequences of Priming Men to View Women as Sexual Objects, 31 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCH. 493 (1995)).
156. Id. (citing T.E. Ford, Effects of Stereotypical Television Portrayals of African-Americans on
Person Perception, 60 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 266 (1997)).
157. Morgan Whitaker, The Legacy of the Willie Horton Ad Lives On, 25 years Later,
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polls dropped.160 Although it is impossible to measure the exact effect of
an ad appealing to racial stereotypes, social psychology research makes clear
the significant impact of subtle priming, even when it consists of a brief
television advertisement.161 Research on priming equips courts to better
understand the extent of the potential damage to a minority candidate
when assessing Senate factor six in cases involving subtle racial appeals.
As an over-arching theme, plaintiffs might turn to the Court’s gui-
dance in Gingles and introduce implicit bias evidence by showing how “so-
cial and historical conditions” interact with existing laws or legal structures
“to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed” by minority vot-
ers.162 A court’s analysis of the social and historical conditions could in-
clude an examination of the effect implicit biases might have played in
creating those conditions. Because the stereotypes may have played a role
in decisions producing inequities and because stereotypes are a product of
societal narratives and mass media, such evidence would fall within the
Gingles guiding language and should be admitted to enable courts to con-
sider the “social and historical conditions” of the situations at issue.
In addition to the seven factors listed in the Senate Report, “other
factors may also be relevant.”163 The non-exhaustive nature of the Senate
Report opens the door to the consideration of research on implicit bias in
its own right.164 Although implicit bias does not necessarily fit within the
framework of every Senate factor or may not be relevant in every case, the
totality of the circumstances test nonetheless provides a means through
which courts can consider implicit bias in the electoral process.
B. Policy Prescriptions
In addition to pushing courts to rely on a framing of the totality of
circumstances test to include evidence of implicit biases, stakeholders, like
local advocates, foundations funding voting rights work, and civil rights
lawyers, can also encourage jurisdictions to adopt practices aimed at reduc-
ing the effects of implicit biases in the electoral process. For electoral poli-
cies to effectively reduce the impact of implicit biases, stakeholders must
ensure that the factors that exacerbate reliance on implicit biases are mini-
mized. As mentioned above, factors such as stress, tight deadlines, and reli-
ance on discretion contribute to one’s reliance on unconscious biases.165
160. Id.
161. See UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 16, at 26-27;
Kang, supra note 18, at 135-39 (discussing stereotypes in media and the neural and emotional
responses to viewing those stereotypes).
162. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
163. Id. at 45; S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28.
164. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (1986); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28.
165. NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 18.
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Policy prescriptions should focus on eliminating or reducing these and
other conditions that foster implicit biases.
1. Training of Election Officials
While most Americans believe that they are able to treat everyone
equally, more than seventy percent of Americans possess some level of im-
plicit bias based on race.166 Without a basic understanding of implicit bias
or recognition that their decisions might be impacted by implicit biases,
election officials cannot take the necessary steps to address the problem.
One of the first steps to reducing implicit biases in the electoral sys-
tem is to educate election officials about implicit bias. Trainings aimed at
raising awareness about the effects of implicit bias and at offering strategies
through which individuals can reduce that bias have been proven to dra-
matically lower participants’ racial biases.167 Many counties and states al-
ready provide poll workers with training before Election Day,168 so
including a segment on implicit bias would serve to start the process of
rooting implicit bias out of the electoral system. In addition to including a
segment on implicit bias in training programs, jurisdictions can also reduce
the impact of implicit biases in electoral decisions by diversifying poll
workers and other election officials. While “the majority of White respon-
dents [to the Implicit Association Test] show a preference for White over
Black, the responses from Black respondents are more varied.”169  As Pro-
ject Implicit explains, “[p]art of this might be understood as Black respon-
dents experiencing the similar negative associations about their group from
experience in their cultural environments, and also experiencing compet-
ing positive associations about their group based on their own group mem-
bership and that of close relations.”170 Regardless of the reasons for the
more varied rates of implicit racial association amongst Black participants
taking the Implicit Association Test, that Black participants have more va-
ried rates of implicit race associations and that IAT scores are strong
predictors of real world behavior171 are reasons to encourage diversity
amongst poll workers. Because other minority group members are also
likely to have more varied implicit racial associations, due to their “own
166. Nosek et al., supra note 12, at 17.
167. See Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice
Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267, 1268 (2012).
168. See Compendium of State Poll Worker Requirements, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM.
(Aug. 2007), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/Compendium%20of%20State%20Poll%20
Worker%20Requirements.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
169. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.ht
ml#faq22 (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
170. Id.
171. Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST.
CTS. 11-13, http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20
Fairness/Implicit%20Bias%20FAQs%20rev.ashx (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
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group membership” and “close relations,” ensuring diversity of poll work-
ers across all races may lower the risk that implicit biases impact the voting
process.172
2. Blind Review of Voter Registration Applications
Jurisdictions might reduce the role of implicit bias in the registration
process by adopting blind review practices, in which the name and race (if
such information is collected) of an applicant is temporarily redacted until
other criteria for eligibility (i.e. criminal record, residency requirements,
etc.) are confirmed. Blind screening has proven extremely effective in
other areas. Major symphony orchestras, for example, have significantly
increased their percentage of female musicians simply by investing in a
cloth screen blocking the musician from the audition committee.173 Al-
though most orchestras previously required musicians to audition directly
in front of an audition committee, by putting up a screen audition com-
mittees can no longer tell the musician’s race, age, gender, or other social
identities.174 The screens effectively break the audition committee’s un-
conscious reliance on the stereotype of a virtuoso musician as male. Simi-
larly, temporarily redacting or otherwise blocking a voter’s name and race,
can help prevent election workers from unconsciously relying on stereo-
types about who is a “responsible citizen” and from unintentionally re-
jecting a registration form for a minor reason.
3. Legislative Responses
A comprehensive response to implicit bias in the electoral system
must also provide for monitoring mechanisms similar to the Section 5
preclearance regime. In their study, What Do I Need to Vote?: Bureaucratic
Discretion and Discrimination by Election Officials, Ariel White and her col-
leagues sent emails to more than 7,000 election officials in forty-eight
states, including states and jurisdictions covered by Section 5 and states and
jurisdictions not covered by Section 5.175 Although the emails were identi-
cal and included an inquiry about voter identification requirements, the
researchers sent some under a Latino alias and some under a White alias.176
The researchers discovered that, overall, election officials were less likely to
respond to an email sent by a Latino than to those sent by a White.177
Importantly, however, they found no bias in response rates or quality of
172. PROJECT IMPLICIT, supra note 169.
173. Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Audi-
tions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 726-27 (2000).
174. Id. at 715-16.
175. White et al., supra note 19, at 140.
176. Id. at 130.
177. Id.
FALL 2015] Barriers to the Ballot Box 53
responses in counties and municipalities covered under Section 5.178 White
and her colleagues stated that this finding is consistent with findings in
other areas, such as employment and housing, which also identify moni-
toring as a key factor in reducing discriminatory decision-making.179 Leg-
islation providing for a monitoring system, like the one previously required
by Section 5, can be introduced at the state and national levels to reduce
implicit bias in the electoral system.180
4. Additional Research and Studies
Finally, but perhaps most important, it is time for individuals, organi-
zations, jurisdictions, and other stakeholders to invest in research on the
role of implicit bias in voting. Social psychologists and others have exten-
sively studied the impact of implicit bias in other areas of law, from crimi-
nal justice to health care to education, yet little attention has been given to
the effects of implicit biases in voting. Research is needed to examine how
implicit biases may impact the election system at all stages, from planning
for an election and allocating resources, to implementing new voting laws,
to Election Day practices. Experiments could test participants’ decision-
making when allocating polling machines to minority or White neighbor-
hoods, the impact of the cross race effect when poll workers implement a
photo identification requirement, or the amount of time a poll worker
gives to resolving an issue for a White voter as compared to a minority
voter.
In designing these experiments, researchers can use studies examin-
ing the effects of implicit biases in other areas as prototypes. An experi-
ment examining how election officials allocate resources might replicate
Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore’s experiment, in which they asked
participants to determine how to administer a mandatory twenty percent
budget cut to student groups.181 Similarly, experiments regarding assis-
tance offered during the voter registration process might replicate the Uni-
versity of Southern California’s study182 in which researchers tested the
response rates of state legislators to emails from hypothetical voters of dif-
ferent races asking about identification requirements.
178. Id.
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180. The Voting Rights Advancement Act, introduced in June 2015 (after the Voting
Rights Amendment Act of 2014 failed in Congress) provides a legislative response to the Su-
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CONCLUSION
When the right to vote is undermined through explicit or implicit
biases, other rights are also at risk of becoming “illusory.”183 The harm of
denying a person the opportunity to participate in the political process on
account of his or her race or ethnic background, even if not “intentional,”
goes beyond the harm to the individual. As with cognate equal protection
claims, the injury is also “to the law as an institution, to the community at
large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our
courts.”184 Steps can be taken to limit the effect of implicit bias in the
electoral system. Section 2 results test claims provide a key opportunity for
courts to consider evidence regarding how implicit biases might impact the
electoral process. In addition, policy reforms at a more local level—hold-
ing implicit bias trainings for poll workers and redacting race on voter
registration forms—provide a means through which stakeholders can re-
duce the detrimental impact of implicit biases on elections. Pursuing both
litigation and policy strategies allows for a practical shift, in which our legal
frameworks and daily electoral practices better account for the unconscious
nature of much bias today. Only when all forms of discrimination are
rooted out of our electoral system will we truly be able to ensure the
health of our democracy.
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